ORBIT · Key provenance

Where did this key come from?

Quantum key distribution can detect an eavesdropper by physics. Post-quantum key exchange resists one by mathematics. ORBIT builds neither. It records, for every session key, which sources fed it and how they were combined, so the answer can be proved later.

RulePost-quantum mandatory · QKD optional
StatusPlanning · design only
HardwareIngested, never built
01 The short version

Two ways to agree a secret. One record of which you used.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) sends single photons between two parties. Because measuring a quantum state disturbs it, an eavesdropper leaves a measurable trace: errors. If the error rate is low enough, the parties distil a shared secret key; if not, they throw it away.

A post-quantum key exchange such as ML-KEM-768 agrees a key over an ordinary network using lattice mathematics that no known quantum algorithm breaks efficiently. It needs no special hardware and works over any link.

Space programmes are investing in QKD, particularly from satellites, while several national security agencies do not recommend it as a replacement for post-quantum cryptography. The ORBIT rule, set by the founder, is post-quantum mandatory, QKD optional: a QKD key may be one input, never the only one, and every key carries a record of where it came from.

02 How QKD works

Photons, bases, errors and a shorter key.

The best-known scheme is BB84. Here it is with a satellite as the sender (Alice) and an optical ground station as the receiver (Bob).

Simulated · BB84 over a space link01 / 04
01 · PHOTONS SENT

One photon, one bit, one random basis.

For each bit Alice picks one of two bases at random. In the rectilinear basis (+) a vertical photon means 0 and a horizontal one means 1. In the diagonal basis (×) the two diagonals carry the bits. Bob, not knowing her choice, picks his own basis at random for each photon.

  • Same basis: Bob reads Alice's bit exactly.
  • Different basis: Bob's result is a coin toss.
02 · BASIS SIFTING

Compare bases in public, keep the matches.

Over an ordinary authenticated channel, Alice and Bob announce which basis they used for each photon, never the bit values. Where the bases differ they discard the bit. About half survive: the sifted key.

03 · ERROR CHECK

An eavesdropper shows up as errors.

They reveal a random sample of sifted bits and measure the quantum bit error rate (QBER). An intercept-and-resend attacker must guess bases too, and about a quarter of the bits she touches come out wrong. Above the abort threshold (around 11% for BB84) the key is discarded: no key is issued.

04 · PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION

Correct, compress, combine, record.

On a clean run, error correction removes the remaining mismatches and privacy amplification hashes the key down to a shorter one about which an eavesdropper knows essentially nothing. In ORBIT's design that QKD key is then one input to a key-derivation function alongside a post-quantum leg, and the result is recorded.

03 The four polarisation states

Two bases, two bits each.

BASIS + · BIT 0

Vertical |

BASIS + · BIT 1

Horizontal —

BASIS × · BIT 0

Diagonal /

BASIS × · BIT 1

Diagonal \

Measuring a diagonal photon in the + basis gives a random answer and destroys the original state. That is the whole trick: an eavesdropper cannot copy a photon (the no-cloning theorem) and cannot measure it without risking a visible error.

04 What QKD does not give you

Physics protects the photons. Not the endpoints.

QKD needs an authenticated classical channel for sifting and error correction. That authentication is ordinary cryptography, so QKD always depends on a signature or MAC scheme, which today should itself be post-quantum.

Real systems also have engineering gaps: weak laser pulses instead of true single photons, detector side channels, trusted relay nodes on long paths, weather and pass windows on satellite links. And QKD agrees a key between two specific devices; it says nothing about who was allowed to use it.

Those are the reasons for the rule. A QKD key is welcome as one more independent input. It is never trusted alone, and the record of what fed each key is mandatory either way.

05 Key-path provenance

Three key paths. One record.

The designed provenance record would describe how a session key was formed, with commitments to its sources rather than the key itself.

PATH 1 · POST-QUANTUM ONLY

Post-quantum key exchange

The session key is planned to come from ML-KEM alongside X25519 (the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid). Works over any link. This is the mandatory baseline.

Planned

PATH 2 · QKD-INGESTED

Key from a QKD system

A key delivered by a customer-supplied QKD system through a standard key-delivery interface, recorded with a commitment to its source. Never the only input.

Planning · design only

PATH 3 · HYBRID

QKD ‖ ML-KEM ‖ X25519

Both legs feed one key-derivation function. The session stays secret if either the physics or the mathematics holds. Client-selectable, fail-closed, and recorded.

Planning · design only

Element (designed)RecordsWhy
ModePost-quantum only · QKD-ingested · hybridThe single fact an auditor asks first.
Post-quantum legKey-exchange suite and parameter setLets a verifier apply the rules of the suite's epoch.
QKD legCommitment to the delivered key's source and identifiersProves a QKD key was used without exposing it.
Source commitmentsHashes binding each inputTwo keys formed differently can never share a record.
CombinationThe key-derivation function and input orderReproducible derivation for the record.
SignatureHybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 through the R-Series engineThe record itself is post-quantum signed.
06 Why hybrid

Two independent reasons to stay secret.

IF THE MATHS FALLS

The QKD leg still holds

If a future attack weakens a lattice key exchange, a key that also mixed in a QKD-distilled secret stays protected, provided the QKD system and its authentication were sound.

IF THE PHYSICS LEAKS

The post-quantum leg still holds

If a QKD device has a side channel or a trusted relay is compromised, the post-quantum leg keeps the session key secret on its own.

FAIL-CLOSED

No silent fallback

If the QKD leg is selected and missing, the session does not quietly drop to one leg. It fails, and the failure is visible.

PROVABLE

The record says which

Years later, a verifier can tell from the record alone whether a session ran post-quantum only, QKD-ingested or hybrid, without trusting the operator's word.

What may be claimed, once built: "QKD-augmented hybrid transport, customer-supplied". Until real QKD hardware is connected, any QKD input in tests is a labelled substitute.
07 Questions

On quantum keys.

Does COSRYX build QKD systems?

No. ORBIT would ingest keys from a customer-supplied QKD system and record their provenance. It builds no optical terminals, photon sources or detectors.

Is QKD required to use ORBIT?

No. Post-quantum cryptography is mandatory; QKD is optional. A programme without QKD runs post-quantum-only key paths.

Why is an 11% error rate the threshold?

For BB84 with one-way post-processing, roughly 11% QBER is the point above which no secret key can be distilled. Real systems set their own, often lower, operational thresholds.

Does the record contain the key?

Never. It contains commitments (hashes) to the inputs and a description of how they were combined, signed through the R-Series engine.

Is the provenance record built?

Not yet. It is a design, waiting for a programme that needs it. The Stage 3 run does not use QKD.

Physics or mathematics. The record says which.

Post-quantum mandatory, QKD optional, and the provenance of every key on the record.

Long-horizon archiveORBIT overview