One photon, one bit, one random basis.
For each bit Alice picks one of two bases at random. In the rectilinear basis (+) a vertical photon means 0 and a horizontal one means 1. In the diagonal basis (×) the two diagonals carry the bits. Bob, not knowing her choice, picks his own basis at random for each photon.
- Same basis: Bob reads Alice's bit exactly.
- Different basis: Bob's result is a coin toss.
Compare bases in public, keep the matches.
Over an ordinary authenticated channel, Alice and Bob announce which basis they used for each photon, never the bit values. Where the bases differ they discard the bit. About half survive: the sifted key.
An eavesdropper shows up as errors.
They reveal a random sample of sifted bits and measure the quantum bit error rate (QBER). An intercept-and-resend attacker must guess bases too, and about a quarter of the bits she touches come out wrong. Above the abort threshold (around 11% for BB84) the key is discarded: no key is issued.
Correct, compress, combine, record.
On a clean run, error correction removes the remaining mismatches and privacy amplification hashes the key down to a shorter one about which an eavesdropper knows essentially nothing. In ORBIT's design that QKD key is then one input to a key-derivation function alongside a post-quantum leg, and the result is recorded.