The command is formed and authorised on the ground.
Mission-operations software forms the telecommand. Two-person authorisation is part of the receipt, because a compromised or coerced ground operator is the usual weak point, not the spacecraft.
- Receipt minted where the command is formed.
- Hybrid-signed through the R-Series engine: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65.
The link carries a frame with a 16-byte tag.
The command crosses the link exactly as it does today: header, payload and an SDLS authentication tag of a few bytes, inside a 1,024-byte telecommand frame. ORBIT adds nothing to the frame.
A per-command post-quantum signature does not fit.
An ML-DSA-87 signature is 4,627 bytes: about five 1,024-byte frames and roughly 18.5 seconds of airtime at 2 kbps. ML-DSA-65 at 3,309 bytes still spans four. Multi-frame objects fail under retransmission and beam handover. So: symmetric MAC per frame, post-quantum for rekeying and firmware, the receipt on the ground.
The receipt binds the sequence count and the acknowledgement.
The ground receipt records the SDLS sequence count the command used and binds the spacecraft's acknowledgement telemetry when it comes down. The encoding is deterministic CBOR, so any implementation reproduces the same bytes.