ORBIT · Space link trust

Every command, accounted for.

ORBIT gives every telecommand a receipt: who authorised it, under which key and epoch, exactly what was sent, and what the spacecraft acknowledged. Minted on the ground, bound to the link, checkable by a third party years later.

Stage 1 · ground trust layerBuilt · Simulation-validated
Link securityUnchanged · none added by DCS
SignersOn the ground only
01 The problem

Command links authenticate. They do not leave evidence.

Fielded command links protect each frame with symmetric cryptography under the CCSDS Space Data Link Security (SDLS) protocol: an authenticated cipher or MAC, a sequence number against replay, and keys managed by the operator. That is the right tool for the link. It is not evidence.

A symmetric tag proves to the spacecraft that the frame came from someone holding the shared key. It cannot prove to an investigator, an insurer or an allied partner, years later, which person authorised the command, under which policy and key epoch, or that the bytes in the archive are the bytes that flew.

ORBIT adds that missing artefact. It covers command authenticity: who authorised, which key and epoch, exactly what was sent, and what the asset acknowledged. Command meaning, safety and executability stay with the mission system; the receipt carries their reference and result and never asserts them.

02 How a command is receipted

Ground-minted. Link-bound. Checked later.

Simulated · frame budget01 / 04
01 · MISSION OPERATIONS

The command is formed and authorised on the ground.

Mission-operations software forms the telecommand. Two-person authorisation is part of the receipt, because a compromised or coerced ground operator is the usual weak point, not the spacecraft.

  • Receipt minted where the command is formed.
  • Hybrid-signed through the R-Series engine: Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65.
02 · ONE FRAME

The link carries a frame with a 16-byte tag.

The command crosses the link exactly as it does today: header, payload and an SDLS authentication tag of a few bytes, inside a 1,024-byte telecommand frame. ORBIT adds nothing to the frame.

03 · WHY NOT SIGN ON THE LINK

A per-command post-quantum signature does not fit.

An ML-DSA-87 signature is 4,627 bytes: about five 1,024-byte frames and roughly 18.5 seconds of airtime at 2 kbps. ML-DSA-65 at 3,309 bytes still spans four. Multi-frame objects fail under retransmission and beam handover. So: symmetric MAC per frame, post-quantum for rekeying and firmware, the receipt on the ground.

04 · THE ACK CLOSES IT

The receipt binds the sequence count and the acknowledgement.

The ground receipt records the SDLS sequence count the command used and binds the spacecraft's acknowledgement telemetry when it comes down. The encoding is deterministic CBOR, so any implementation reproduces the same bytes.

03 The arithmetic

Bytes decide where trust can live.

1,024 BTelecommand frame. The budget every command has to fit.
3,309 BML-DSA-65 signature. Spans four frames, so a signature per command cannot ride in one frame.
4,627 BML-DSA-87 signature. About five frames and roughly 18.5 seconds at 2 kbps.
16 BThe symmetric authentication tag the frame already carries.

4,627 bytes × 8 bits ÷ 2,000 bits per second ≈ 18.5 seconds. Uplink rates of 2–4 kbps are typical of telemetry, tracking and command links.

04 What it contains

Four pieces, all on the ground.

AUTHORISATION EVIDENCE

Ground command receipts

An authorisation receipt minted in mission operations, bound to the SDLS sequence count and the acknowledgement telemetry, countersigning around the approved link security and never replacing it. Two-person authorisation and pre-authorised emergency modes are part of the profile.

Built · Simulation-validated

KEY LIFECYCLE

Receipted key events

Every key generation, activation, rotation, revocation and recovery becomes a receipt in a signed key registry, so a verifier knows which key was valid at signing time.

Built

FIRMWARE

Hash-based firmware signing

Firmware batches signed with single-tree LMS. Devices will verify LMS signatures; signer state will remain in the ground HSM, and every signature will be receipted.

Planned

ENCODING

Deterministic CBOR on the ground side

One deterministic encoding for the ground and the archive; nothing added to the link. Two independent implementations produce identical bytes, so the ground can re-encode and verify without trusting the encoder.

Built

05 Where things run

Signers on the ground. Verifiers in flight.

Verification is stateless. The dangerous state belongs with the signer: a hash-based signer must never reuse a one-time key, and a single-event upset corrupting signer state in orbit is a key compromise. So no stateful signer ever goes on board.

The flight-side component is tiny, deterministic and frozen: no dependency tree, no cloud call, no network call to DCS, and it must keep working if DCS ceases to exist.

ComponentRuns
Receipt issueGround · mission operations
Key registryGround
Hash-based firmware signerGround · hardware security module
Firmware verifySpacecraft · the integrator's own code
Link protectionUnchanged · SDLS
VerificationAnywhere · independent verifier
06 Fail-safe, not only fail-closed

An emergency command must never be rejected by paperwork.

EMERGENCY MODES

Authorised in advance

Light-time delay makes real-time human approval impossible. Emergency modes are pre-authorised with a governance receipt that carries a validity window.

VERDICTS

Refused ≠ unverifiable

The profile separates "refused by policy" from "unverifiable", so an inquiry can tell a deliberate block from a broken record.

INQUIRY

Use is receipted too

Every use of an emergency mode is itself receipted, so the later investigation sees exactly when the normal rules were set aside and on whose authority.

07 Defence profiles

The parameters are chosen per programme.

Everything is sized today on the default: ML-DSA-65, ML-KEM-768, SHA-256. A stronger defence profile is planned: ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, SHA-384, with single-tree LMS for firmware. That choice belongs to each programme's approving authority.

UseDefaultDefence-style
SignatureML-DSA-65 + Ed25519ML-DSA-87
Key agreementML-KEM-768 (+ X25519)ML-KEM-1024
HashSHA-256SHA-384
FirmwareSingle-tree LMSSingle-tree LMS
StateIn developmentPlanning · per programme
08 Questions

On the space link.

Does this change anything that flies?

The ground receipts need nothing new on the spacecraft. The platform's own firmware verification stays the integrator's code. The separate Stage 3 run puts a small software container on a host's payload computer; see the Stage 3 run.

Why bind the receipt to the SDLS sequence count?

The sequence count ties a ground record to the exact frame the spacecraft accepted. With the acknowledgement telemetry, it shows what was sent and what was received, not only what was intended.

Is it post-quantum all the way through?

No, and it is not claimed. The link keeps its symmetric protection. Post-quantum signatures protect the receipts on the ground and are planned for rekeying and firmware; per-command post-quantum signing in flight does not fit narrow links today.

Has this run on a live mission link?

Not yet. The ground trust layer is built and runs in simulation. No flight qualification is claimed.

We do not replace mission security. We add mission evidence.

A receipt per command, minted where the command is formed, that an inquiry can verify without access to your systems.

Decisions under link lossORBIT overview